19/11/2001
AN ISRAELI VIEW
Is the Palestinian Authority significant?
by Ephraim Inbar
The premise of the Oslo process was that, since the
Israelis have failed to govern the territories
successfully (Jews seem to be unfit for an occupying
role), they should find a suitable Palestinian to do it
effectively, someone who, in the words of the late
Yitzhak Rabin, can act "without the High Court and
without B'Tselem" (i.e., would not be troubled by its
citizens having recourse to the High Court and civil
rights organizations). Israelis were led to believe that
Arafat suited the role of leader who could establish a
Palestinian entity that would have good neighborly
relations with Israel.
This did not work very well, primarily because of
Arafat's governing style and political ambitions. He
was unwilling to suppress the armed opposition
groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) that continued to
engage in terrorism against Israel. Moreover, the
Palestinian Authority (PA) expanded its own military
capabilities by an increase in the number of armed
soldiers and by equipping them with mortars, anti-tank
weapons and man portable anti-aircraft missiles, all in
flagrant violation of signed agreements with Israel. In
fact, Arafat allowed the PA and its security organs to
turn into what Israel Defense Force Chief of General
Staff Shaul Mofaz called "a terrorist entity," which
holds radical aspirations such as the relocation of
numerous Palestinian refugees to Israel.
Arafat seems unable to rule, i.e., to maintain a
modicum of law and order in the territories under his
control. We are witnessing the beginning of the
"Lebanonization" of the PA, which is indicated by the
emergence of a myriad of armed groups displaying
only partial loyalty to Arafat. In addition, the
deteriorating economic situation generated by limited
access to the Israeli market creates demands upon the
PA, which it is unable to meet, furthering the erosion
in its authority and legitimacy.
Such challenges are reinforced by widespread
Palestinian perceptions of the ruling elite as corrupt
and authoritarian. The PA increasingly fails to provide
basic needs, such as personal security and a minimum
standard of living for its citizens. We may soon see
the breakdown of the PA into several cantons
effectively ruled by new barons, who have almost full
monopoly over arms in their fiefdoms. The PA may
well turn into a failed state.
The desire to prevent the anarchical characteristic of
failed states is understandable and this is the main
motivation for the attempts to save and strengthen
Arafat. Yet the belief that Arafat can change and
behave reasonably, or that a strong PA is beneficial
for Israel, is questionable.
In short, Arafat and his coterie are part of the problem
and not of the solution. Therefore, we should think
about a third option (in addition to Israeli occupation
and Arafat's rule)--chaos. This is not a pleasant
thought. Chaos in the territories poses a security
problem to Israel. Such a problem is less acute if the
fragmented Palestinian armed groups do not
coordinate their low-intensity conflict against Israel.
Anarchy in the territories may allow Israel a freer
hand in dealing with the terrorists.
Indeed, a situation of chaos might ultimately yield
positive results. The collapse of the PA will weaken
the young Palestinian national movement. Palestinian
nationalism has been a source of endemic violence in
the past and is a recipe for regional instability in the
future. It threatens at least two "nice" states--Israel and
Jordan--and has continuously supported policies of
radical regimes such as Iraq and Libya. It is also
thoroughly anti-American.
The collapse of the PA and the failure of the
Palestinian national movement to establish a
successful state might reduce the appetite of the
Palestinians for an independent entity. Although
failures rarely affect the political fortunes of Arab
leaders (as with Egyptian President Gamel Abdul
Nasser or Iraqi President Saddam Hussein), Arafat as
a symbol of the Palestinian national movement might
be seriously tainted in the case of the PA falling apart,
and this could bring to the forefront a more realistic
and conciliatory leadership.
It is misleading to portray Hamas as the only
alternative to Arafat. It is his current ally. Moreover,
the disintegration of the PA would be a public
relations debacle for the Palestinians and would elicit
greater understanding in the world for Israeli fears of
its destructive implications.
Disorder in the territories could be the incentive for
fresh thinking on the Palestinian issue on the part of
the Palestinians, as well as elsewhere. More chaos in
the Palestinian-ruled territories might open up new
opportunities to stabilize the situation. The
internecine violence of the previous Intifada led to
acceptance of the Madrid conference formula--a clear
indication of growing political realism among the
Palestinians. The failed PA experiment could be a
sobering experience leading to a more politically
mature body politic.
Chaos as an interim situation is not necessarily the
worst-case scenario. Therefore, Israel might have an
interest in Arafat taking a fall.- Published 19/11/01
(c) bitterlemons.org
Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-
Ilan University and the Director of its Begin-Sadat
(BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.